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1 Introduction e objective of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is to achieve the EU's carbon emission goals at minimum cost. Instead of imposing a xed tax, the policy determines an emission level and lets the market determine the equilibrium price. Ideally, this system ensures that all rms incur the same price for emissions, and abatement should be realized where it is cheapest, such that the aggregate abatement cost is minimized. However, abatement costs are not the only costs arising from an emissions trading scheme: just like any other regulation, this policy has to be implemented and managed by rms, causing a wide range of administrative, managerial and information-related transaction costs. Typically, such transaction costs are unobserved by the econometrician. Presumably, many rms themselves do not account explicitly for the value of their employees' time and resources spent in the course of EU ETS compliance and optimization. is study uses rm-level data to estimate such transaction costs and argues that their magnitude is relevant for some of the regulated rms and should be taken into account when assessing the e ciency of the EU ETS.
To identify transaction costs, I exploit an important aspect of EU ETS regulation: the possibility to use not only European certi cates but also international o set credits. e EU ETS has been linked to the international certi cate market created through the Kyoto framework. On aggregate, these additional foreign certi cates increase the cap for European polluters and decrease their compliance cost. O set credits have been cheaper than European credits (European Union Allowances, EAUs)
throughout Phase II of the EU ETS (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . e quantity of o set credits used in the EU is limited by a rm-speci c o set quota (entitlement) xed by the regulator. For the rms, o set usage was an unambiguous way to reduce compliance cost. Nevertheless, a considerable share of regulated rms did not use any o set credits.
is study brings together elements, on the one hand, from literature on the use of o set certi cates in the EU ETS (Trotignon, 2012a; Ellerman et al., 2014) and, on the other hand, theoretical literature on the impact of transaction costs on emissions trading (Stavins, 1995; Montero, 1998) . Moreover, this research relates to contingent valuation theory and uses binary quantile methodology (Kordas, 2006; Belluzzo Jr, 2004) .
While the abatement incentives of cap-and-trade schemes have been amply discussed, most of the literature does not consider transaction costs and other frictions arising from practical management of compliance. However, emissions trading -just like any other market transaction -is unlikely to be completely free of transaction costs. In his seminal paper, Coase (1960) underlines that the irrelevancy of initial property allocation for nal resource allocation holds only if frictions are negligible. e theoretical importance for cap-and-trade regulation of such frictional "costs to use the price mechanism" is modeled by Stavins (1995) and Montero (1998) . Stavins (1995) shows that a major problem arising from transaction costs is that they make the initial allocation non-neutral, such that free allocation (like in Phase II of the EU ETS) has an impact on the resulting market equilibrium outcome. Montero (1998) moreover adds the impact of uncertainty and technology constraints.
Empirical evidence on transaction costs in environmental policy is relatively scarce, as McCann et al. (2005) note in their literature review on this topic: transaction costs are rarely evaluated, maybe simply because of their latent unobservable nature. Literature suggests that transaction costs and other market imperfections have hampered the impact of US environmental trading programs (Tietenberg, 2006; Hahn and Hester, 1989) . For example, Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991) argue that trading has been too scarce to reach a cost-e cient outcome; they claim that this ine ciency stems from the bilateral, sequential nature of trades leading to frictions (and thus transaction costs in a broad sense).
Concerning the EU ETS, the literature generally nds that small rms trade more "passively" and that many rms seem to lack institutional capacity for optimal trading (Sando and Schaad, 2009) . A common strategy among German SMEs is to trade only at the end of the year and only if the grandfathered allocation is not su cient (Loeschel et al., 2011) . Surveys show that large emi ers set up more sophisticated structures to optimize their compliance and face smaller per-tonne transaction costs (Heindl, 2012; Jaraite and Kazukauskas, 2012; Loeschel et al., 2010 Loeschel et al., , 2011 . Similarly supporting the idea of xed costs, Jaraite et al. (2010) estimate that per tonne participation costs of the largest rms were e0.05 per tonne of emissions, while they were up to e2 per tonne for small rms. Schleich and Betz (2004) underline that allocations are so generous that the average need for additional permits for SMEs is only about 1,250 tCO2e per year, an amount at which participation costs are likely to be higher than the actual certi cate cost. Virtually all empirical work on transaction costs in the EU ETS is based on survey-data, except Jaraite and Kazukauskas (2012) who use transaction data from Phase I (2005 Phase I ( -2007 , the test phase of the policy. ey claim that transaction costs were a substantial factor stopping rms from actively trading EUAs, but they do not estimate their magnitude. e observed trading pa ern is consistent with the existence of entry costs: it appears that rms trade rarely and most transactions take place between plants belonging to the same rm (Zaklan, 2012; Jaraite and Kazukauskas, 2012) . 1 Rather than using survey data, I use administrative data on rm behavior. Anderson and Sallee (2011) identify marginal costs of regulating fuel-standards by observing to what extent car producers use a regulatory loophole of known costs to avoid the fuel-e ciency standards. Conceptually, this is close to the present study which identi es xed costs by observing what bene ts rms forwent in order to avoid trading. Using binary choice to identify a latent variable, this study relates to the revealed-preference methodology used in (nonmarket) contingent valuation of environmental goods (e.g. Benne and Blamey, 2001 ). antile models have been developed by Koenker and Basse (1978) , but have only recently been applied to binary choice by Kordas (2006 ). Belluzzo Jr (2004 uses them to estimate the distribution of willingness-to-pay for a public good, which is analogous to the present study: transaction costs are measured here from the observed "unwillingness-to-bene t" of rms.
While the previously cited literature examines trading schemes with only one type of certi cates, the literature on linked schemes with two certi cate types is limited. Trotignon (2012b) describes how o sets have been used in the EU ETS and shows that rms initially used few o sets until 2011, when there was a sharp increase. He estimates the cumulated savings of rms at e1.5 billion. An aggregate view going up to the end of Phase II in 2012 is provided by Ellerman et al. (2014) .
is study provides both a descriptive and an analytical contribution to the literature. First, it describes the observed o set usage behavior. Among rms that failed to participate in the o set market, there are mostly small rms and more particularly those rms with relatively generous free allocations of European certi cates. Across all rms, forgone revenue adds up to around e1.37 billion. In a second step, I argue that rms' reluctance to participate can be explained by transaction costs. Without such unobserved transaction costs, the o set entitlement would be an unequivocal "free lunch" opportunity.
e large share of rms forgoing these pro ts can only be rationalized by the interference of some unobserved frictions: transaction costs, as de ned in this study, can include employees' time/salaries, 1 However, transaction data needed for such analysis is only available for the Phase I of the EU ETS.
training and consultancy costs. ey are assumed xed and payable whenever a rm rst decides to engage in o set trading or emissions trading in general; therefore, they might also be called "entry costs".
e theoretical section lays out how transaction costs change the rms' optimization problem. It builds on Stavins (1995) , however I introduce a second type of certi cates and simplify by accounting only for xed transaction costs. It establishes that such costs can make the rms' free allocation of permits non-neutral, as rms with allocations larger than their emission do not need to engage in emissions trading: they can avoid transaction costs of active trading, such that they are less likely to use their o set entitlement. e model establishes a link between, on one hand, the decision to participate in the o set market and, on the other hand, both the initial allocation status and the potential bene t from o set usage. e fundamental assumption is that a rm renounces the potential bene ts from o set trading only if the incurred transaction costs are higher than these bene ts.
e empirical section uses this insight to estimate the latent transaction costs necessary to rationalize rms' decision not to participate in the o set market. is is the rst study that estimates transaction cost using binary quantile regression. I identify the distribution of two cost components:
general transaction cost of trading and o set-speci c cost. e empirical results show that participation cost in the o set market is relatively low for most rms with a median of e905. e additional general trading cost is much higher with a median cost of e7,770. However, the estimated distribution of these costs is highly skewed, such that the means are much higher than the medians (e21,519 for average general participation plus e83,675 for o set market participation), resulting from some large outliers. A probit regression of the conditional mean would thus be misleading about the costs faced by the majority of rms. Although these transaction costs are o en small compared to other production factors, they make active participation unpro table for 21% of the rms. For bigger rms, investment in o set certi cates remains pro table.
e remainder of this article is organized as follows. A er introducing the institutional and legal framework of international o set certi cates (Section 2.1), I brie y explain the aggregate impact of o set trading in the EU ETS (Section 2.2) and the de nition of transaction costs in this context (Section 2.3). I then set up a model of rm-behavior in the reference case, i.e. without any transaction/entry costs (Section 3.1), which is extended by adding entry costs (Section 3.2). Finally, I present the data and some stylized facts, explain the econometric methodology (Section 4) and present the estimated distribution of transaction costs (Section 5).
2 Background e EU ETS and the international o set credits are part of a complex regulatory framework. is section brie y explains the key elements of regulation. It further sketches out the aggregate mechanics of introducing a second type of certi cates into an emissions trading system. Finally, this section details what sort of costs fall under this study's very broad de nition of the term "transaction costs".
Institutional framework
Each year, the EU issues EU emission allowances (EUAs) that sum up to the overall EU ETS emission cap for that year. In Phase II -the period under study here -virtually all these certi cates were distributed free of charge to the regulated rms, according to their historic emission levels (called However, the central registry of the UNEP shows that the number of o sets generated until the end of 2012 was much higher than aggregate o set usage rights within the EU. 6 Market data shows that o set prices collapsed to virtually zero a er the end of Phase II, which shows that the EU ETS demand 2 As CERs and ERUs can be used interchangeably under this legislation, I will from now on only use the term "o sets" while everything applies equally to CERs and ERUs.
3 Directive 2009/29/EC 4 O set certi cates have been criticized because they rely on the fundamental criterion of additionality, which is virtually impossible to ensure completely. Some types of certi cates, in particular those from "industrial gas" projects, seem too easily manipulated such that they are not further accepted in Phase III of the EU ETS. eoretically, in addition to EU rm-level demand (analyzed in this study) there was scope for additional demand coming from the state-level; however, at the state-level of the Kyoto framework, o sets were perfect substitutes for Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). ese certi cates are traded infrequently and bilaterally, mostly directly between participating states, such that there is no transparent market price. However, given the large AAU overallocation of ex-Soviet Union states (so-called "hot air"), the evidence suggests that AAUs are sold usually far below the price of EUAs, CERs and ERUs (Aldrich and Koerner, 2012 International o set credits cover emissions from geographic regions that are not previously included in the scope of EU ETS. As such, they are a spatial exibility mechanism (Stevens and Rose, 2002) allowing rms to abate where it is cheapest (other countries, especially developing countries) and have the abatement credited via the creation of o set credits. e creation of o set certi cates increases the overall cap imposed by the EU ETS. Potentially, the cap could increase by an amount equal to the sum of all rms' o set entitlements. In practice, it depends on prices whether the regulatory o set quantity limit or the supply of o set certi cates determines the overall amount of certi cates available.
e resulting market equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 : in an unregulated situation, emissions have no cost and rms emit E * unreg'd . Without o set credits, the standard result for emissions trading holds: the market clears at the regulated maximum emission levelĒ at price p e , equal to the marginal abatement cost atĒ (Trotignon, 2012b 
De nition of transaction costs
Beyond the direct cost of the emission certi cates, the EU ETS causes a number of information-related and management frictions which I summarize under the term transaction costs. As Heindl (2012) explains, the EU ETS produces costs through di erent channels:
• Costs from monitoring, reporting and validating emissions (MRV);
• Service charges of the EU registry and other formal administrative costs;
• Salaries of people employed by the rm for trading and information gathering and forecasting of allowance prices, and
• Costs induced by nding trading partners, bargaining, contracting and managing price risk.
e rst two sources of participation costs are unavoidable and should thus not explain rms' nonparticipation in the o set market. e la er two sources of participation costs are directly related to rms' active trading participation and might explain why rms do not venture into the o set market.
In the following, the term transaction cost is de ned as costs arising from trade (direct transaction costs) and from information gathering about market structure and management (indirect costs); it is likely to include personnel salaries, recruiting cost, consulting fees, etc. It does not include monitoring and reporting of emissions, administrative cost for EU/national agencies, and generally any other "unavoidable" cost. is study does not di erentiate between internal costs and external consultancy costs.
is is a more narrow de nition than in some other work which considers the overall cost of establishing, managing, monitoring and enforcing a policy (Krutilla and Krause, 2010; Joas and Flachsland, 2014) . 7 Heindl (2012) nds that information-procurement alone -the biggest upfront cost to entering active trading -costs rms about 17 employee-workdays. He also nds that information and trading costs do not depend on rm size. Most surveys present their results at a per-tonne basis, i.e. interpreting them as variable (rather than xed) costs, cf. Table 1. Typically, these transaction costs are unobserved. However, they clearly exist. A multitude of news and data providers (Point Carbon), consulting rms (ICIS/Tschach) and nancial transaction services (brokerage like TFS Green, exchange platforms like ICE) have emerged.
e fact that rms use such costly services indicates that there must be an information problem. Moreover, descriptive 7 In particular, this study concentrates on rms' costs and does not take into account what Joas and Flachsland (2014) call "public-sector costs" incurred by the regulatory authority.
8 Mostly own computation from estimated parameters stated in the original studies.
management literature highlights the discrepancy between actual and intended market practice, with rms use simple heuristics instead of full optimization and show reluctance to trade (e.g. Veal and Mouzas, 2012) . As the nal transaction is virtually cost-free, transaction costs are in this context largely due to upfront costs of information procurement. Just as an example, se ing up a trading account at the ICE -the biggest exchange, clearing about 90% of emission certi cate trade in Europe -costs e2,500
in direct fees, 9 while an individual transaction therea er costs only cents. 1011
Model
First, a static model describes rm's optimization problem in presence of two types of emission certicates without transaction costs. In a second step, I examine how optimal behavior changes in presence of xed transaction costs. Simply put, rms always want to use o set credits, unless transaction costs are prohibitively high compared to potential pro ts from using the cheaper o set credits.
Emissions trading with o set credits: least-cost scenario
For the purpose of this study, it is useful to look at rms' optimization problem aggregated over Phase II, which is qualitatively equivalent to looking just at the last year of o set validity. 12 As a reference case, this subsection examines emissions trading with two types of certi cates without participation costs. I show that rms can separate the decision of optimal emission levels (and produced quantities) from the partitioning between European and o set certi cates. is point considerably simpli es the analysis in the subsequent section 3.2, where we concentrate on the la er decision.
In absence of o sets, it has been shown (e.g. by Montgomery, 1972 ) that there is a market equilibrium ensuring that marginal abatement cost is constant across rms and equal to the EUA price p e . e present model adds a second type of certi cates, such that each rm i solves the following optimization problem:
subject to
where equation (1) is the pro t maximization with C(Y i , E i ) the production cost, which depends 9 As indicated on h ps://www.theice.com/fees (March 1,2015) 10 Convery and Redmond (2007) establish a list of direct transaction fees: brokers have relatively large minimum trade sizes and take between 1 and 5 cent fee per certi cate (tCO2e). Exchanges take smaller trades and charge between 0.5 and 3 cent per certi cate.
11 Note that in theory transaction costs could also consist in the actual abatement cost that internationally operating rms could incur if they decide to create o set certi cates in their own plants abroad, rather than purchasing the certi cates on a market place. is study assumes that the large majority of rms bought their certi cates, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence about o sets. is claim cannot be proved however, due to data restrictions. If this claim is not true, the estimations in this study remain valid, but their interpretation changes from transaction/entry costs to ine ciencies in the generation of o sets.
12 Note that allocations and o set entitlements for the whole period were known to the rms at the beginning of Phase II (from the NAPs).
on emissions E i and output Y i . 13 As usual, I assume that increasing production Y i (at a xed emission level) increases cost, i.e. C Y (Y i , E i ) > 0, and reducing emissions (at a given production level) increases
i are the o sets used in Phase II and Q e i are used EUAs. T (Q o i , Q e i ) is the cost of complying with ETS rules, i.e. the cost of buying the certi cate quantities Q e i and Q o i necessary to cover the emission level E i (equations (2) and (3)). At the beginning of Phase II, rms are given free allocation of European certi cates A i ; they can sell super uous certi cates at market price p e . e rm-speci c constant K i in equation (4) is the regulated quota for o set usage. e overall amount of EUAs in the market is xed by total allocations over all rms.
e rm has to solve three problems simultaneously: decide on the optimal produced quantity Y i , determine the optimal emission level E i and split compliance (i.e. an amount of certi cates equal to E i ) between international o set and European certi cates. e rst-order conditions require quantity to be chosen optimally given production cost C(Y i , E i ) and prices. Let us assume that the production function C and prices p are such that there exists a function Y * i (E i ) giving the optimal quantity produced for any given emission level at given prices. 15 Compliance cost T (Q o i , Q e i ) results from the cost incurred for both types of certi cates. To satisfy the rst-order condition for emissions, marginal abatement cost has to be equal to marginal compliance cost: 16
e compliance cost arises from an optimal partitioning of certi cates between EUAs and o sets, given the price di erential and the quantity restriction on o sets. e marginal cost is either p e or p o depending on which sort of certi cate is used to cover the last (marginal) emission. As previously seen, o sets are perfect substitutes for EUAs up to a certain quantity limit; their price is thus at most as high as an EUA's price, but never higher (p e − p o =: ∆ p ≥ 0). 17 e result is straightforward and illustrated in Figure 2 : as a perfect substitute at a lower price, o set credits are clearly preferable to EUAs, up to the regulated quota (entitlement). Only if emissions are above K i , the rm complies for remaining emissions by using the more expensive EUAs. Compared to a system with only EUAs, the rm saves an amount equal to ∆ p K i . e compliance cost can be simpli ed to T * (E i ) giving for all emission levels E i the compliance cost resulting from an optimal split between European and o set certi cates. e equation for T * (E i ) then enters the optimization problem as a constraint: 18 13 Emissions Ei and output Yi as well as all other variables are aggregated over the entire Phase II (2008 14 CY and CE denote the partial derivatives with respect to Y and E, respectively. 15 A competitive market hypothesis simpli es this part, but is not essential to the subsequent argument, as long as there is a single equilibrium quantity Y * (E * ). 16 Using the competitive market hypothesis and the envelope theorem to get from equation (6) to (7)). 17 For the purpose of this study, I only consider situations in which o set certi cates are strictly cheaper than EUAs, as the alternative where both prices are equal is qualitatively not di erent from a system without o sets. Moreover, the data reveals that in practice there has always been a clear price discount for o set certi cates. 18 e pro t's last term in equation (1) Figure 2 : Deciding on the optimal quantity of EUAs and o sets (no entry cost, reference case)
Entry costs for both certi cate markets
We will now see how xed participation costs on the o set market change the rm's problem. I assume that rms face some general entry cost to participate in any certi cate trading, i.e. the cost of se ing up a trading department no ma er the type of certi cates, and an additional cost to participate in the o set market. ey can avoid both costs if they use only their freely allocated European certi cates.
Firms with optimal emissions bigger than their allocation are forced to buy certi cates and cannot avoid the general participation cost. Compliance cost from equation (3) has now two additional terms:
where
where a rm incurs general information entry costs T e if it buys any certi cates, but needs to pay an additional information cost T o to participate in the less well-known o set market. is specication also implements the idea that rms which are "long" in equilibrium, i.e. which received more free allocations than needed for their optimal emissions (A i > E * i ), are not obliged to actively trade certi cates. "Short" rms need to enter the market to buy some certi cates anyways and should thus consider the general participation cost T e sunk when deciding about o set usage. 19 e impact of 19 is de nition is not ideal: rather than conditioning on rms being forced to trade, one would like to condition on rms actually trading. However, the data does not allow this distinction. As a consequence, the estimate for transaction costs is downward biased. transaction costs on o set usage and incurred total cost depends on the relative magnitudes of T o ,
(c) Low entry costs Figure 3 : Deciding on the optimal quantity of European and o set certi cates (with entry cost on both markets) Figure 3 illustrates the three possible situations. In Figure 3a , o set entry costs are high such that
In this case, entering the o set market is not useful at any emission level. Firms still have to incur entry cost T e to enter the EUA market if their emissions are higher than their free allocation, which results in a discontinuity at E i = A i . In Figure 3b , T o is relatively low, but T o + T e is so high that o sets alone are unpro table. As T o < K i ∆ p , rms which already incur entry price T e (because
ere is thus a similar discontinuity as in 3a, but the jump is reduced from T e to T e + T o − K i ∆ p , because the rm cashes in some gains from o set usage. Finally, Figure 3c shows the situation if both entry costs are relatively low such that a rm uses o sets as soon as its emissions are above the threshold.
Cases (a) and (b) illustrate situations in which entry costs may make initial allocation non-neutral, as they produce a jump in the cost curve. Following the "Coase theorem", initial allocation does not ma er for the nal outcome if bargaining is possible and cheap. In presence of transaction cost however, such as in Figure 3 , initial allocation has an impact on rms' probability to use o set credits.
e direct e ect of participation costs on total compliance cost T * (E) does not impact the marginal cost-bene t analysis: both above and below A i , rms face a marginal price of p e . Even in case (c), the slope of the cost curve is p e for most rms and only the very exceptional rms face a marginal certi cate price of p o .
Let "allocation status" 1 long i be a dummy variable indicating that allocation A i is larger than emissions E * i , such that optimizing compliance simpli es to the decision whether to use o set certi cates: 20
A rm participates if it is worth incurring the entry costs, which depend on the allocation statuslong or short -of the rm. e empirical section uses the prediction that a short rm not participating must imply that ∆ p K i < T o and a long rm not participating shows that
20 See Appendix on page 27 for more details on the potential interaction of transaction costs and allocation status.
the same inequalities are reversed for participating rms. Note that this solution implies an "all-ornothing" decision as long as entry cost is xed. Observe as well that in spite of these frictions, marginal abatement cost is equalized across the large majority of rms at the level of p e , just like in the no-cost reference case.
otherwise.
An important assumption is that rms take prices as given here: every individual rm is too small to consider its own impact on the price level, i.e. there is no market power on the certi cate market. On the aggregate, p e depends on the number of rms using o set certi cates. To the extent that transaction costs reduce access to the o set market, they are not neutral for p e and thus for Y * and E * . 21
4 Data and empirical research design 
Data sources
is study mainly relies on the data of the European ETS Registry (European Union Transaction Log, EUTL) which is a compilation of member states' national registries of Phase I and II (2005-2012) . is comprehensive administrative data comprises the allocated EUAs, veri ed emissions and used (surrendered) certi cates (EUAs, CERs and ERUs) for all 13,590 plants subject to ETS compliance obligations in Phase II. Moreover, a matching with Bureau van Dijk's Orbis company database reveals ownership structures that link many of these individual plants. 22 is matching is important as the relevant decision is likely to happen at the rm level, even though regulation, allocation and o set entitlements are de ned at plant level. A er some data cleaning, 23 there remain around 9,000 plants belonging to 4,578 rms. Over half of the plants belong to rms owning just one plant.
e plant-speci c o set quantity limit K i is the product of a nation-speci c o set quota multiplied by the plant's free allocations A i over Phase II. e magnitude of this quota has been chosen by national governments, but the EU has restricted the maximum to 22%, as implemented in Germany or Spain. For the purpose of this study, the limits have been computed by this rule and veri ed using the International ere are second-order e ects as well, as participation costs impact the demand for o sets: this decreases the o set price p o and increases the EUA price p e . While these price e ects are essential for a general equilibrium and welfare assessment, they are not informative on transaction costs and are beyond the scope of this study.
22 For more information on this matching, see Jaraite et al. (2013) or their website h p://fsr.eui.eu/CPRU/EUTLTransactionData.aspx 23 Plants from countries that do not participate in the standard way described in Section 2.1 (Estonia, Iceland, Lithuania, Liechtenstein, Malta and Norway; 220 plants) and some which have o set-use beyond the legal limit (most likely because of merger and acquisition transactions which are unobserved in this data set; 94 plants) are excluded. Around 3,000 plants never register any emission or cease existing in 2011 and 2012, so they are excluded as well. such that 80% of the rms could cover all of their emissions using only grandfathered allocations (they will further be called "long" rms). However, o set entitlement K i has been so small that only a meager 2.8% of rms is able to comply by using o sets only. EUAs. Figure 4 shows that the price di erential was rather small in the beginning. A er few months, the spread became clearer and o sets have been up to e7 cheaper than EUAs. e spread increased with time and was rather volatile. On average the price di erence was e3.60.
is price spread has allowed rms to achieve considerable savings, 24 reaching e217.4 million for 24 Savings are approximated by multiplying the annual average price spread with the amount of o set certi cates used in that year, because the actual transaction details (date/price) are not observed. the largest rm.Altogether, rms have saved an overall amount of e3.6 billion. However, the aggregate additional unused 288 million tCO2e certi cates could have generated another e1.37 billion at 2012 prices. Among participants, rms have saved on average e799,000 while the median is only e31,200. 25
Evidence for transaction costs
As mentioned before, many rms did not use their o set entitlements. Given the large supply of o set certi cates and their relatively low price, this is surprising. One potential explanation for rms not participating in the market is that their expected pay-o was not high enough to cover transaction costs of information procurement, such as the cost of hiring additional personnel or devoting existing resources to compliance optimization. e stylized facts supporting this idea are (a) a largely binary behavior between using either the maximum allowed or no o sets at all; (b) the non-neutrality of EUA allocation status for participating in the o set market; and (c) an increasing likelihood of participating in the o set market as o set entitlement increases.
Firms have mostly followed an "all-or-nothing" strategy in their o set usage, suggesting the presence of xed participation cost: Figure 5 shows the used o sets as a percentage of the total o set entitlement. One can see two frequency spikes: over half of the rms use all their o set entitlements and almost a quarter of the rms use none. Finally the last quarter of rms use some but not all of their o set entitlement. While per-unit costs would lead to a marginal trade-o and intermediate usage rates, a xed cost incurred for market entry could explain such a binary behavior. It is interesting to note that many multi-plant rms with intermediary usage are composed of plants that expose an all-or-nothing behavior: it seems likely that this results from coordination problems within rms. e main consequence of transaction costs is that they make initial allocation non neutral (Stavins, 1995) . With xed costs, rms with large credit entitlements should participate more as entry costs become small compared to the potential gain. Moreover, short rms are legally bound to trade so that 25 ese numbers take prices as given, so they cannot be interpreted as the general-equilibrium savings from o set usage: as seen in Section 2.2, the counterfactual EUA price in absence of o set credits would have been higher than the observed prices. e de facto achieved savings from o set usage are probably higher than my esstimates used in Table 2 . Stephan et al. (2014) estimate demand elasticity as being relatively high, such that actual rms' savings may be as high as e20 billion, as o set availability decreased the overall stringency of the cap. Moreover, it does not include the incurred transaction costs. they should consider general trading cost as sunk, whereas the o set-speci c cost applies to both long and short rms. Figure 6a shows the interaction between the size and the allocation status: at lower size deciles, rms use o sets relatively rarely, with a large di erence between long and short rms. As size increases, rms become more likely to use more o sets, while at the same time the di erence between long and short rms becomes less marked. At the tenth size decile, virtually all rms participate and there is no signi cant di erence between long and short rms' behavior.
Assuming that rms take rational decisions, plants that do not participate must estimate their participation cost to be higher than their potential pro t, such that the mean o set entitlement multiplied by the mean price spread should give us a lower bound of the magnitude of these transaction costs (similar to the reasoning in A anasio and Paiella, 2011). At the same time, the opposite is true for participating rms. ese two distributions largely overlap, but Figure 6b shows that the means and medians are strongly di erent. In general non-participating rms tend to be smaller, with half of rms below 3,600 tCO2e of o set entitlements (while the median is 16,600 tCO2e for participating rms).
Nevertheless, the distributions both stretch out until above 50,000 tCO2e, showing that the separation is not clear cut. e largest non-participant rm has 262,000 tCO2e entitlement, and the 9 percentiles of the potential pro t distribution above this value all participate. Among participating rms, the size distribution of long and short rms is similar. On the opposite, small short rms are overrepresented in the non-participating group. is gives us an order of magnitude of avoided transaction costs. Figure 6b shows that the size distribution of rms' o set entitlements is highly unequal, and similar inequality is true for emissions, number of plants and grandfathered allocations. e empirical methods used need to be chosen such that they are robust to these rare and extremely large outlier rms.
Econometric methodology
e model gives us an indication about the link between rm behavior (using any o set credits or not) and the magnitudes of the unknown entry costs T o and T e to be estimated, relative to the known quantities A i , E i and ∆ p K i . We want to measure the unobserved (latent) xed transaction cost T C * i , while observing only the binary outcome 1 o i equal to 1 if T C i is smaller than ∆ p K i : 27
In this binary choice setup, ∆ p K i is the rm-speci c cut-o value relevant for the decision to participate. Other than in most binary choice se ings, e.g. standard probit, a rm-speci c cut-o allows us to identify an intercept as it xes a scale for the two estimated parameters T o and T e in terms of units of ∆ p K i (i.e. Euros). 28 is method to use preference revelation is similar to the methodology of contingent valuation, o en used to analyze "willingness-to-pay" (WTP). Here, rather than estimating WTP, I interpret the foregone pro ts as "unwillingness-to-bene t" to identify transaction costs. 29 If the error term was assumed to be iid following a normal distribution, equation (15) 
e probit regression draws its identi cation from the conditional mean assumption E( i |x) = 0 27 We observe a transformation of the latent variable by an indicator function, which is a monotone transformation. See Koenker and Hallock (2001) on the equivariance of quantile estimates to monotone transformations. 28 Ki is measured in tCO2e of o set entitlement and ∆p is the average price spread measured in e/tCO2e. 29 Note that unlike most of the contingent valuation literature this study does not use survey methods, in other words, I am working with revealed preferences rather than stated preferences. I therefore avoid much of the standard critique of contingent valuation methodology, which questions the validity of survey answers, cf. Diamond and Hausman (1994) 30 e standard normalization of a probit sets the standard deviation σ to 1; in contrast, the standard deviation is a free parameter here. and the normality assumption, while the following methodology estimates the median and thus is identi ed over the assumption that the conditional median error is zero. e earliest estimator using this semi-parametric assumption is the maximum score estimator by Manski (1975) . At the median (with τ = .5) this estimator maximizes the number of "correct predictions" using an indicator function:
Similarly to the median, we can estimate other conditional quantiles. While this estimator is relatively intuitive, it is not continuous, which makes it di cult to optimize and determine standard errors.
To solve this problem, Horowitz (1992) formulates a smoothed maximum score estimator using a kernel function to get a continuous function of the estimated parameters, which is extended to quantiles other than the median by Kordas (2006) . e smoothed binary quantile estimator at quantile τ ∈ (0, 1)
is the solution to the following problem:
where Φ(·) is a continuous, di erentiable kernel function and h n an appropriate bandwidth that tends to zero as sample size increases.
e estimation of this model involves the optimization over a complex function, in particular when using the discrete version of equation (18). I use R to implement Kordas' S-Plus/Fortran code to perform simulated annealing following the algorithm of Go e et al. (1994) . Simulated annealing has the advantage of being more robust to starting values, local optima and discrete parts of the objective function;
although computationally more demanding, the full code including bootstrapping runs in less than six hours . With a large sample such as the one used in this study, results of Manski's discrete quantile maximum estimator and Horowitz' smoothed estimator turn out to be virtually identical. Standard errors for both estimators are calculated by bootstrap methods.
Estimation results
e results show that transaction costs are roughly e100,000 on average, which results from a skewed distribution: many rms face small transaction costs, while a few rms have very high costs. In particular, the o set-speci c cost is much smaller for most rms. is section illustrates how quantile regressions can add valuable information if the underlying distribution is asymmetric.
e binary quantile regression estimates the distribution of transaction costs from which each rm draws its realized transaction cost. Note that this is di erent from transaction costs for di erent sizes of rms. As this distribution is not assumed to follow a known functional form, it is described here by estimating 19 quantiles, from the 5th to the 95th percentile in steps of 5 percentage points. For be er readability, Table 3 shows only selected quantiles, while Figure 7 shows the full estimation for all quantiles (19 separate estimations).
e transaction cost components are measured in units of potential pro t, i.e. in euros. e median o set-speci c cost T o is estimated around e905, which means that a short rm with enough o set entitlement to generate e905 of o set revenue has a 50% chance of participating. While transaction Table 3 : Estimates from the binary quantile estimator costs are relatively low around e500 for the lower quarter of the transaction cost distribution, their values are high at the upper end with e201,919 for the highest quantile (τ = .95). e distribution for T e indicates that long rms (with generous initial allocations) are much more reluctant to participate. At the median, their behavior is consistent with an additional cost equivalent to e7,770. is goes up to the higher quantile estimates around e41,900 for τ = 0.95. A long rm thus needs e7,770+ e905= e8,675 to have a 50% participation probability. e quantile analysis reveals that the transaction cost distribution spans a large range and is strongly skewed : while the di erence between the median quantile and lower quantiles is small, there are large outliers driving the estimates of the highest quantiles. Consequently, the means (lower part of Table 3 ) 31 can be misleading about the transaction cost distribution. Of a similar order of magnitude, the probit estimates (of the conditional mean) are also much higher than the median. 32 Figure 7 plots probit estimates with a cross and adds the distribution of the normal error to represent the distribution implied by probit assumptions. 33 It shows that in spite of the similar means, quantile and probit estimates are signi cantly di erent for most quantiles and yield very di erent views on the transaction cost distribution.
Note that for virtually all quantiles, the impact of allocation status is stronger than the o setspeci c transaction cost: the bulk of transaction costs stems from the general cost component T e . 31 Means from the quantile regression are computed with the following steps: (a) estimate quantile parameters in 5% steps from the 5th percentile to the 95th; (b) predict participation probability depending on rm characteristics (see Appendix D) ; (c) impute transaction cost from τ equal to predicted probability; and (d) take average across all observed rms. 32 More detail on these parametric estimations can be found in the Appendix on page 29. 33 Due to the renormalization, the error term does not follow a standard normal distribution, instead having a larger standard deviation. 34 antile estimates for all 5th percentiles from 5% to 95%. e do ed green line is the mean estimate from probit, the shaded bands represent the point-wise 95% con dence intervals. is means that it is not the o set trading per se, but rather the cost of emissions trading in general that stopped rms from using their o set entitlement. However this nding is completely hidden if we look only at the means, both from probit and from quantile regression (Table 3) , which show that transaction cost for o set are on average larger than the ones for general trading. ere are some large outliers in the distribution of T o .
A straightforward way to make these results more intuitive is to switch the axis of the standard quantile plot Figure 7 in order to get the estimated cumulated density function of rm's transaction costs as shown in Figure 8a . From there, one can infer a probability density function from this CDF by using standard kernel density methods as in Figure 8b . Again, these gures show how the high mean of T o is driven by some large outliers: the tail of the probability density function of the o set-speci c transaction cost shows a bump that is driven by the only four non-participating rms with potential pro ts above e200,000. e mean may be considered a misleading statistic in such a case. smaller emi ers, the quantile method predicts participation probability much be er than the probit.
Analoguously, the t of the quantile estimation is strong if evaluated with the method outlined by Kordas (2006) , i.e. checking that predicted and observed probabilities roughly coincide (cf. Appendix on page 31). However, the be er t does not come as a surprise: the quantile model ts 38 free parameters, while the probit only ts three free parameters. 
Sector-speci c results
While a full sector-speci c analysis is not possible with a data set of this size, the right-hand side of Table 3 shows the result if I broadly separate manufacturing and electricity-generating rms. Electricity and heat generation account for one third of all rms, and half of total emissions. 36 Electricity rms are known to have active and sophisticated compliance and trading behavior, likely because of the experience from electricity trading (Heindl, 2012) .
Results (Table 3 and Figure 10 ) show that this sector separation explains some of the observed transaction cost heterogeneity: while costs are similar around the median for manufacturing and electricity rms, I do not nd any large outlier in the electricity sector, such that this sector's means are considerably lower compared to manufacturing. e high result at the 95th percentile of the pooled estimation is driven only by a handful of manufacturing rms.
e estimates for several quantiles of the general cost T e are not signi cant for electricity and heat generation rms. Moreover the probit estimate is not signi cant. As virtually all large electricity rms trade emission certi cates, it is di cult to precisely identify this general component. For manufacturing however, estimates are very similar to the ones for the general case: means are much higher than medians, o set-speci c cost are less relevant than general cost for most of the distribution and the means nevertheless are higher for T o .
36 Readers familiar with the EU ETS might nd these numbers low. Note that the electricity market is characterized by large rms owning many plants, such that their share in the overall number of rms appears small. Moreover, I use NACE 2 codes of the rms' main activity rather than the activity code that led the rm to be regulated under the EU ETS; e.g. hospitals (main activity) fall under the EU ETS regulation, because they typically run large fossil-fuel power generators for back-up power and heating. Prior work has used survey data to show that compliance with the EU ETS generates managerial costs. To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst study establishing a framework to assess these transaction costs empirically through the use of administrative data. ese entry costs are estimated to be at the median e7,770 (average e21,519) for general participation in the certi cate market (be it EUA or o set certi cates) plus e905 (average e83,675) for o set participation. Overall, the empirical results underline that the behavior on the o set market is signi cantly impacted by initial allocation:
for most rms transaction costs are largely due to general participation in emissions trading, rather than the o set market speci c setup costs. However, this average hides a large heterogeneity that is best captured by a quantile estimation that suggests that these means are driven by some large outliers.
As a consequence, this study illustrates the advantage of using binary quantile methods rather than usual parametric approaches that focus on the mean.
Environmental policy aims at reducing ecological harm at minimum cost to society. Most academic and policy-related work accounts for direct compliance or abatement cost of the EU ETS. However -just like any regulation -the EU ETS causes administrative and management-related transaction costs. My estimates suggest that these costs are relevant in practice: rms signi cantly deviate from the least-cost scenario. Indeed, designing policy is "an empirical ma er" as Montero (1998) puts it.
Usually, optimal regulation aims at giving the optimal incentive structure, while this study argues that regulatory complexity also creates costs. As the objective of a regulation becomes more complicated, there appears to be a trade-o between incentive perfection and a need to keep complexity for the regulated rms at bay -incentives only work as intended if they are understood and implemented at low cost. In this perspective, this paper aims at contributing to the practical debate about the shape of environmental policy. Empirical evidence for transaction costs calls for more simple permit designs, rather than more sophisticated (but complicated) policy designs. e problem is even more stringent if the costs impact rms di erently, such as the xed costs estimated in this study, where only large rms bene t from the cost reduction of o set certi cates. On this last point, some action has been taken on national level with programs excluding small emi ers from the scheme, e.g. the UK "Small emi er and hospital opt-out" program.
My residual de nition of transaction costs addresses only part of the actually arising transaction costs: all other costs that are not choice-dependent, i.e. cannot be in uenced by rm behavior, cannot be captured with my methodology, e.g. costs due to monitoring and reporting and registry fees. 37 In a way, my estimates are thus the lower bound of the costs that should be included in the policy discussion.
More importantly, these transaction costs are not synonymous with overall e ciency loss: while e ort spent in information gathering is certainly not welfare-improving, a real welfare e ect analysis would need to look at the bigger picture of the general equilibrium. It would be interesting to estimate the impact of o set certi cates on EUA prices, as well as to further dig into the price distortions (both on EUAs and o sets) caused by transaction costs.
e estimated transaction cost is a "black box" measuring all the frictions stopping rms from investing in o sets. It remains to be analyzed exactly what these costs include and how they could consequently be reduced to implement a less distortionary policy. In fact, this study cannot di erentiate between nancial costs and more "behavioral" reasons, such as ina ention, salience, risk aversion, misperceptions, etc. Importantly, rms' aversion to use o sets could also be due to reputation considerations, as o sets have received bad press in most countries. 38 However, we are talking about the behavior of rms, such that psychological factors should play less a role than they do for consumer decisions. Finally, the claim that frictions are considerable remains valid even if they stem from behavioral factors rather than purely e ciency-driven cost considerations. 37 Registry fees in Phase II ranged from e100 for the period to e15,000 per year, depending on the country and (for some countries) emission size, cf. EUTL website. 38 e VAT tax fraud as well as cyber-a acks on registries in 2010 and 2011 touched mostly European certi cates and should not impact this study's results. However, there was considerable public discussion about the actual additionality of o sets. Note that while this might explain rms' unwillingness to use o sets in general, it seems unlikely that it a ects the identi cation of the general transaction cost component. Table 4 : O set limits collected from National Allocation Plans by Elsworth et al. (2012) B Are emissions constrained by transaction costs?
A National o set entitlement rules
In Section 3.2, I claim that rms do not strategically constrain (or "manipulate") their emissions to be just below allocation level, even though rms face a cost curve that jumps when emissions increase beyond this level (Figure 3a) . is assumption is important, as I use the fact that short rms, with emissions above allocations, are constrained to trade while long rms can choose whether to incur trading entry costs. However, this methodology is awed if transaction costs lead rms to manipulate their allocation status. is section argues, that this case is unlikely to be relevant in practice. Firms choose their production and emissions given production cost and certi cate prices; the additional transaction cost is likely to be smaller than the cost of adjusting emissions and production. Empirically, there is no signi cant discontinuity around the allocation status threshold.
First, note that the rm faces the same marginal cost p e for emissions both below and above the jump of Figure 3a and 3b, such that marginal abatement cost does not play a role. However, overall compliance cost increases; the rm thus compares two situations: one where emissions are reduced to allocation level A i , such that optimal production is Y * (A i ) and entry costs are not incurred, and another situation where E * i > A i is chosen such that marginal abatement cost equals p e and entry cost is incurred.
e rm reduces its emissions to A i if the change in pro t ∆ π resulting from this reduction is positive:
By assumption, we are looking here at cases where optimal emissions E * i > A i and thus Y * (E * i ) > Y * (A i ); by de nition of the optimal emission level E * i , ∆ π would always be negative without the transaction cost terms of equation (21) (or, to be more precise, the le -hand side of equation ( )). As seen on Figure 3 , the change in incurred transaction cost is either T e , as on Figure 3a , or T e +T o −∆ p K, see Figure 3b .
Anecdotal and survey evidence (Loeschel et al., 2010 (Loeschel et al., , 2011 suggests that rms do not have precise and continuous control over their emissions, or rather that there are considerable transaction costs to obtain such control. Only large companies regularly track their emissions throughout the year. e trading scheme's incentives to reduce emissions do not work on a short-term "accurate to the tonne" level, but rather on a long-term technology-inducing level.
Most technologies are such that in the short term the actual technological margin to reduce emissions without a complete corresponding reduction of output is limited; reducing emissions by a certain share is thus equivalent to reducing production by the same share. A er all, emissions are just one production cost factor among many others and the short-run exibility of the cost function is usually low (meaning that emission reductions are to a large extent matched by reductions in the produced outcome). Emission reductions are mostly accomplished in the long term through technical change, whereas this study is looking at short term behavior. Even for a small di erence between E * i and A i it is likely that ∆ π is strictly negative.
A priori this case thus seems not so relevant in practice. However, it cannot be veri ed fully, as information on prices p, quantities Y and production costs are not available, neither cost function C(Y, E) nor the pro t change ∆ π can be estimated. Instead, one way of gathering (descriptive) evidence on this point comes from checking whether we observe any crowding or "bunching" of emission levels just below E = A. If many rms were manipulating their allocation status, the distribution of this ratio would be somewhat discontinuous around E/A = 1. Figure 11 implements McCrary's test for continuity (McCrary, 2008) . e estimated densities on the le and on the right of the cut-o where A = E seem smooth on Figure 11a : at a discontinuity magnitude of .0116 (in logs) and a standard error of .1133, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no bunching around the threshold, or put di erently, that the ratio's density function is continuous around this point. Moreover, restraining emissions to become long should be particularly relevant for rms that do not use o set certi cates, as they incur transaction costs anyways. erefore Figure 11b shows the McCrary test only for the rms that do not participate in the o set market: while the discontinuity appears somewhat clearer here, there is still no signi cant bunching at E = A (discontinuity estimate at -.3910 with standard error of .2766).
A notable exception might be emission savings by electricity generating plants, as some rms have scope for fuel-switching across di erent plants and emission costs are a more important cost factor in this industry. However, the McCrary test also does not show a signi cant jump if we are looking at electricity rms only.
While theoretically not fully sound, the assumption of exogenous allocation status thus seems empirically valid and in line with anecdotal evidence. 
C Parametric estimation results
A standard way to estimate the parameters of equation (15) 
Standard statistical packages normalize the standard deviation σ to 1. A re-normalization then yields the parameters of interest: 40
e stylized facts presented in Section 4 strongly suggest that this homoskedastic normality assumption does not hold. As shown before, the distribution of o set entitlements is highly skewed with some rms more than 500 times bigger than the (relatively low) median. Moreover, some rms with high K i still do not exploit their o set entitlement, such that the distribution of i from the transaction cost equation (15) is likely to have some large outliers. e (conditional) mean is a statistic much more sensitive to outliers than the (conditional) median; di erently put, the normal distribution assumption has light tails which consequently give large weight to outliers.
A slightly more exible functional form relaxing the homoskedasticity assumption, would be the mixed probit: error terms are still assumed to have a normal distribution, but the variance scales with the size (here K i ) of the rm. In such a location-scale model, the variance of each i depends on some scaling variable and a parameter γ (to be estimated):
is section shows the results for both assumptions, while claiming that they are not an accurate description of the data. e results the probit estimation in both the homoskedastic and (linearly) heteroskedastic versions are shown in Table 5 . 41 e costs indicated are measured in euros, as they are normalized by the cut-o value's ∆ p K i coe cient. e estimate for T o , the transaction cost for o set usage, is larger than the estimate for T e , while both are signi cant. When I include the sectors, the estimates for transaction costs in the manufacturing sector are much higher than in the electricity and heat generation sector. In particular, general trading cost T e seems not relevant for electricity and heat generating rms. 40 Standard errors for the re-arranged parameters are computed using Stata's nlcom command, based on the delta method. 41 Estimated using Stata oglm command by Williams (2010 Kordas (2006) suggests verifying the t of the quantile regressions by predicting probability intervals for each observation and verifying that each interval group has a participation rate close to the predicted probability. Predicting probabilities from the binary quantile regression is simple: one needs to nd the smallest quantileτ i such that the pro t-net-of-transaction costs is positive:
en this gives us an interval for the conditional participation probability:
whereτ i,−1 is the quantile immediately precedingτ i .
For the data used in this study this gives the predicted and observed probabilities displayed in Table 6 . Except for the lowest quantile, the models seem to t the data reasonably well. On the opposite, the probit model predicts for all rms a participation probability above 50%: one could says that all non-participating rms are unpredicted outliers (false-negatives) with the probit model. 
